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THE DOCTRINE OF FOAKES V. BEER IN WASHINGTON
"Resolved by the whole court that payment of a lesser sum
on the day in satisfaction of a greater cannot be any satisfaction for the whole . . ."
This dictum of Lord Coke in 16021 antedated the development of
consideration and its technical accuracy has been questioned.2 It has,
however, shown an astonishing vitality. After consideration emerged,
Coke's idea was worked into consideration terms by Lord Ellenborough, 3 and has become part of the broader idea that the doing
of something which was the subject of an antecedent legal duty will
not be sufficient consideration. 4 Many later cases' have embraced
the rule, among them Foakes v. Beer,6 which has provided a popular
title for the doctrine.
Application of the rule to defeat discharge of a money debt by nayment of a part, received by the creditor as full satisfaction, has been
severely criticized.' In this situation, two jurisdictions have abandoned
the rule by decision, 8 others by statute.9
'Pinnel's Case, 5 Rep. 117a, Moor. 677 (1602).
-For a thorough discussion of the genesis and development of the
doctrine see Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 Hv.
L. REV.
515. Mr. Ames here describes the fundamental error upon which he feels
this doctrine rests.
3 In Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230 (1804), Lord Ellenborough stated that
"there must be some consideration for the relinquishment of the residue;
something collateral, to show a possibility of benefit to the party relinquishing his further claim, otherwise the agreement is nudum pactum."
See the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 76 for the definition as to
precisely what promises, acts, or forbearances will be treated as consideration.
'Two common ways in which this problem arises are where part of
a matured debt is paid for the release of the entire debt and where the
debt is paid in full in exchange for additional promises by the obligee.
51
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cases footnoted.
54 L. J. Q. B. 130, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1885).
"'... the courts, while so ruling, have rarely failed upon any recurrence of the question to criticize and condemn its reasonableness, justice,
fairness, or honesty." Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 351, 352
(1891). "The history of judicial decisions upon the subject has shown
a constant effort to escape from its absurdity and injustice." Harper v.
Graham, 20 Ohio 106, 115 (1851). "For many years, however, courts have
been dissatisfied with this rule . . . It is certainly not in accordance with
ethics, and ought not to be in accord with the rules of law . . . Brown
v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 214, 57 Pac. 798, 799 (1899).
8May Bros. v. Doggett, 155 Miss. 849, 124 So. 476 (1929); Clayton v.
Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 22 So. 189, 37 L. R. A. 771, 60 Am. St. Rep. 521 (1897);
Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 68 Atl. 325, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1197 (1907)
0ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 5643; CALIF. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937)
§ 1524; GEo. CODE (1933) c. 20 § 1205; MAINE REv. STAT. (1916) c. 63 § 1231;
N. C. CODE (1935) § 895; N. D. Comp. LAWS (1913) § 5828; OREGON CODE
(1930) c. 9 § 706; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 787; TENN. CODE (1884) § 4539;
VA. CODE (1936) § 5765.

1941]

COMMENTS

The Washington decisions on the problem are not harmonious. 10
Although our court has followed Foakes v. Beer in a variety of situations,11
there are a number of money debt cases which circumvent the
2
rule.'
I. MONEY JUDGMENTS

In two early decisions the judgment debtor secured a release upon
payment of but part of the judgment. Brown v. Kern" stated that
it is "not necessary to overturn the established doctrine [Foakes v.
Beer]" but then found the release binding:
"By reason of that agreement she obtained the payment
of the amount agreed upon and, under the circumstances of
this case at least, she cannot now, while holding on to the
fruits of that agreement, be heard to
say that the agreement
4
was without consideration to her."'

10 The greater number of cases involving discharge do not involve
Foakes v. Beer, each having- failed to meet fully its requisites of a
liquidated sum, attempted discharge by the giving of a lesser sum, at or
after the maturity date, and with no additional consideration involved.
For these cases see the WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS (1935) § 417; also Comment (1933) 8 WASH. L. REv. 112 and 165.
""The earliest opinion is Tolmie v. Dean, 1 Wash. Terr. 46 (1858).
The employee under employment for a fixed term and at a fixed compensation was held unable to enforce a promise for higher wages. Other
instances where the rule has been followed: Sanford v. Royal Insurance
Co., 11 Wash. 653, 40 Pac. 609 (1895), release of a liquidated fire insurance
claim to the insurer for partial payment; Lewis v. McReavy, 7 Wash. 294,
34 Pac. 832 (1893), a promise by the assignee to share the policy proceeds
when assignor already under duty to assign; Seattle, Renton & S. Ry. Co.
v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co., 63 Wash. 639, 116 Pac. 289 (1911), a payment of the liquidated sum when under duty to pay the liquidated sum
plus the charge for current consumed in excess of a stated minimum;
Taylor v. Howard, 70 Wash. 217, 126 Pac. 423 (1912), a promissory note
executed to secure surrender of another note which holder was under
a duty to release; Champagne v. McDonald, 141 Wash. 617, 251 Pac. 874
(1927), a promise to extend the due date and to reduce the amount of
the note if paid at a specified day after maturity. The most recent case
is Goodwin v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 196 Wash. 391, 83 P.
(2d) 231 (1938). The policyholder, entitled to borrow the surrender
value of his policy at simple interest of 6 per cent, was not bound on
his promise to pay compound interest of 6 per cent. The cases are collected in the WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTS
§ 76 (a) and § 76 (b). A supplement to this collection appears in (1938)
13 WASH. L. REv. 20.
"1Related are several cases involving construction contracts. They
involve the question of whether the full performance of an existing duty
to the obligee will support an additional promise by that obligee. Evans
v. Oregon-Washington RR. Co., 58 Wash. 429, 108 Pac. 1095, 28 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 455 (1910), and Smith Sand & Gravel Co. v. Corbin, 102 Wash. 306,
173 Pac. 16 (1918), held the additional promise binding. The rationale
was that an intermediate contract rescinded the former duties and a
subsequent contract defined the new, augmented duties. Nelson v. Seattle,
180 Wash. 1, 38 P. (2d) 1034 (1934), also held the additional promise
binding. The rationale involved estoppel.
1321 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798 (1899).
"' In Baldwin v. Daly, 41 Wash. 416, 419, 83 Pac. 724, 725 (1906), the
court said of Brown v. Kern: "And while it is true that courts have disagreed on the question whether the payment of a part of a debt is a
sufficient consideration to support an agreement for the release of the
whole, this court has taken part with the courts holding such contracts
to be founded on a sufficient consideration . . ." The Brown case doesn't
support this broad statement. The Baldwin case turned on another issue.
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The court recognized and gave some
15 weight to the fact that certain
collateral consideration was involved.
The court in Williams v. Blumenthal"6 followed the Brown case.
Here again the element of collateral consideration (release of the
debtor's right of appeal) was mentioned, 17 but it should be noticed
that the satisfaction did not recite this release as part of the consideration bargained for and may not have been so regarded by the parties. 18
These early cases have never been overruled and Brown v. Kern was
cited with apparent approval as recently as 1940.11
II. ALIMONY DECREES
In Vigelius v. Vigelius20 a wife sued for alimony alleged to be accrued. The husband defended by showing an agreement made between
himself and the wife, by which he would pay and she accept as full
satisfaction sums less than the decree provided, and that he had performed this agreement. The court held that the modified agreement,
fully executed, would not be disturbed for want of consideration:
"While Mr. Vigelius has not fully executed the modifying
agreement, in the sense that he has not paid future maturing
obligations thereunder, he has fully executed it to the extent
of timely paying all past maturing obligations thereunder over
a period of more than 12 years. This, we are of the opinion,
constitutes such an execution of the modifying agreement on
his part as to warrant us in holding that it should not now
be disturbed for want of consideration in its making."
III. LEASE AGREEMENTS
In Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co.,2 1 the lessee, unable to meet

his rent, told the lessor of his troubles and thereafter remitted various
amounts less than the stipulated rent. When the lease terminated the
lessor brought suit for the contract balance, some $25,000. The court
cited the Brown and Williams cases and denied relief, arguing that
upon a lessee's default, the lessor:
"... may treat the contract as abrogated2 2 and enter into a
new contract with the tenant. If he does the latter, the mutual promises made by the one to the other furnish the consideration for the agreement."
15".. .it appears from the facts .. .that additional security was given,
viz., the shares of mining stock above referred to. They might be of as
much value as the note or indorsement of third parties." 21 Wash. 211,
217, 57 Pac. 798, 800 (1900).
"27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 393 (1901).
17 This element of consideration has been recognized by subsequent
opinions. In Seattle Investors Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores of
Washington, 177 Wash. 125, 30 P. (2d) 956 (1934), both the Brown and
the Williams cases were distinguished and the court then applied the
rule of Foakes v. Beer.
1"The RESTATEMENT,

CONTRACTS § 75 specifies that "consideration for

the promise is... bargainedfor and given in exchange for the promise."

(Italics supplied.)
Welsh v. Loomis, 105 Wash. Dec. 325, 105 P. (2d) 500 (1940).
(2d) 425 (1932).
21 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921).
"2 The precise use of the word "abrogate" is not indicated. The closest
dictionary synonym is "annul"; the probable use here is "rescind."
19

20169 Wash. 190, 13 P.
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When duties are at least in part mutually executory, contract law
recognizes the power of the parties to enter a contract of rescission
with a mutual release of rights furnishing consideration; thereafter
they may agree anew on whatever terms are desired. 23 But the
intermediate, contract of rescission should be intended by the parties
rather than raised as a legal fiction. 24 Otherwise the court is simply
circumventing the requisite of consideration. The facts of the Conlan
case refute such a rescission for no agreement was evidenced and the
parties dealt with the varying amounts paid from month to month as
full satisfaction 25 of the -monthly rental 26 under the original lease.
Seattle Investors Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores of Washington27 indicated the court would sustain only the executed terms of
the modified contract. Under a true rescission, however, the new
contract could redefine the executory as well as the executed obligations of the parties. This indicates that these cases might instead be
approaching the problem on some basis of estoppel. Such an approach
is suggested in the opinion of Hidden v. German Savings & Loan
Society2":
"But in reliance on the promise made, the respondents
continued in possession of the property and paid not only the
overdue interest which they were already obligated to pay
but additional interest under the modified agreement to the
amount of more than $3,000. .. . After the respondents had
thus changed their position, and after the agreement had thus
been executed and acquiesced in for such a length of time, it
certainly does not lie with the appellant to say that the
original agreement was without consideration or void."

36
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§ 406. If the contract has been executed by one of the parties
thereto, it cannot be modified except by an agreement supported by new
consideration. Stauffer v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 184 Wash.
431, 51 P. (2d) 390 (1935).
24
The RESTATEMENT, CoNRACs § 20 reads in part: "A manifestation of
mutual assent by the parties to an informal contract is essential to its
formation and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be
done with the intent to do those acts . ..
" 0Distinguish those instances where the landlord defers payment of
rent, a mere gratuitous extension of time without a release intended.
See Cobb Healy Investment Co. v. Tall, 181 Wash. 300, 42 P. (2d) 1107
(1935).
.0A number of cases are in accord with the principle that part payment accepted in satisfaction of matured rent will be binding on the
landlord. These are collected in 43 A. L. IL 1451 (1926) and 93 A. L. R.
1404 (1934).
2T177 Wash. 125, 30 P. (2d) 956 (1934). The tenant paid certain delinquent sums by a check reading payment in full for all rent "until end
of tenancy." The landlord obliterated the endorsement contract and
cashed the check.
28 48 Wash. 384, 387, 93 Pac. 668, 669 (1908).
This is not a lease agreement, but the situations are alike. The mortgage was in default. The
parties agreed to a payment of a lesser sum than was then due in lieu
of interest to date, to a reduction in the rate of interest, and to an extension of the mortgage. The mortgagee now refuses to treat as sufficient a tender based upon the new agreement.
TtAcTs
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WAGE CONTRACTS

The employer and the employee often operate under an individual
or a union contract controlling hours and wages. 2 Can there be full
satisfaction when an employee accepts and cashes a check for a
lesser sum than is due?30 Three recent opinions hold there may be.3"
In Yanoscheck v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 3 2 the employee believed
he was earning overtime wages for the Sundays worked.33 However,
over a two-year period he accepted wages weekly and signed company
records carrying the statement, "Received payment for wages due..
No payment included any overtime earnings. Relief was denied the
employee, the court concluding:
".. . the evidence of the weekly statements and settlements
and of the written signature of the appellant to receipts and
admissions in connection with those statements throughout
the long course of his employment . . . precludes him, as a
matter of law, from
now contending that the respondent is
34
indebted to him."

This was followed by Herman v. Golden Arrow Dairy. 5 Here,
though a union contract called for overtime wages, the employer paid
and the employee accepted "per diem" wages. The usual check endorsement, "in full to date," was subscribed by the employee. Suit
29The status of the employee-unionist and his rights under a contract
negotiated by his union is rapidly changing. Not many years ago such
contracts were without any legal effect, but by means of such concepts
as "creating a usage", "third party beneficiary" and "agency" they are
more generally enforced today. The question is discussed in Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1925) 10 ST. Louis L. REV. 1;
Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HARv. L.
REV. 572: Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in American Labor
Union Agreements (1933), 9 IND. L. J. 69.
30 Several
of these cases are not in point as statute or public policy
instead of contract law controls the decision. For example: in Rhodes v.
Tacoma, 97 Wash. 341, 166 Pac. 647 (1917), the city official recovered the
unpaid part of his salary because the city ordinance determined the salary
and any agreement to the contrary is void as against public policy; and
in Stover v. Winston Bros. Co., 185 Wash. 416, 55 P. (2d) 821, appeal
dismissed, 299 U. S. 508 (1936), the employees recovered because the
contractor agreed with the city that wages would correspond to those
paid by the city.
3' An earlier opinion is to the contrary. Glenz v. Tacoma Ry. & Power
Co.. 125 Wash. 650, 216 Pac. 842 (1923) held the illiterate employee could
not intend his signature to the endorsement contract on the paychecks to
be an accord and satisfaction. Cf. First National Bank v. White-Dulaney
Co., 123 Wash. 220, 212 Pac. 262 (1923), holding knowledge of the legal
effect of an endorsement is immaterial.
.2176 Wash. 137, 28 P. (2d) 270 (1934).
" The employer claimed their agreement called for a weekly salary
of $24; the employee, a daily wage of $4. The emplyoee's position, night
watchman, often required Sunday work.
" The opinion cited no authorities. The respondent's brief emphasized
the principles of waiver and estoppel, citing Jennings v. Prudential
Insurance Company, 18 Misc. Rep. 470, 42 N. Y. S. 50 (1896), where the
employee was held to have waived his claim to the agreed wages, and
Shade v. Sisson Mill and Lumber Co., 115 Cal. 357, 47 Pac. 135 (1896),
where the estoppel statute defeated the employee's claim.
191 Wash. 582, 71 P. (2d) 581 (1937).
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was brought for overtime wages. The court again denied relief on
the ground of estoppel:
"Assuming that, under the terms of the contract, he would
have been entitled to overtime, he has by his conduct estopped
himself from claiming compensation for it..."
The third and most recent decision is Huston v. Washington Wood
and Coal Co.3 6 A union contract called for certain wages; the employee worked for a lesser sum for two years without complaint
before bringing suit. The court refused his claim, deeming another
employment contract governed. To fortify the decision the court
added:
"Conceding, for sake of argument, that under the terms of
the union contract appellant would have been entitled to the
compensation he claims, he has by his conduct estopped himself from claiming compensation under the contract."
CONCLUSION

Quite clearly, the foregoing cases represent a circumvention of
37
Foakes v. Beer, for the facts of each satisfy the requisites of the rule.
To achieve this result the early opinions held the obligee "could not
now be heard to show lack of consideration after receiving the benefits
of his promise". The three most recent decisions stated simply that
the creditor was "precluded" or ."estopped."
True estoppel, declares Williston,3 is the taking from one the right
to deny the truth of his representations of fact when causing reasonable reliance by another Vyho now would suffer some harm. But in
these cases the obligor is under defined contract duties. In the eyes
of the law it would be impossible for him reasonably to have relied
upon representations of full satisfaction or to have suffered harm
thereby. He was fully aware of the duties assumed under the contract and was but attempting to avoid full performance. "Estoppel",
as the term, is normally understood, does not exist in these cases and
its use appears to be by way of a fiction.
Promissory estoppel is on occasion used as a substitute for consideration. The RESTATEMENT

OF

CONTRACTS defines it 39 to be a prom-

ise to another, reasonably calculated to induce action or forbearance
of a substantial character, and followed by such action or forbearance
that injury will result if the promise is not now performed. The
foregoing cases seem hardly to come within the principle of promissory estoppel.40 Justified reliance and a detrimental change of position are not present.
Since the facts of the several Washington decisions discussed are
fairly typical of all the cases in which a debtor has attempted to discharge a money obligation by partial payment, 41 their cumulative
effect is to suggest that our court is by indirection abandoning Foakes
0 4 Wn. (2d) 449, 103 P. (2d) 1095 (1940).
3'See supra, note 10.
3'1 WILLISTON AND THOmpISON, CoNTRACTs § 139.
so § 90.
40 The scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is discussed in
Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ? (1937) 35 VhCH. L. REv. 908.
"1For a similar problem not involving a money obligation, see Luther
v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn. (2d) 470, 98 P. (2d) 667 (1940), noted
in this issue of the law review. (1941) 16 WAsH. L. REv. 49.
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v. Beer. The results in these cases may be right. The desirability of
the rule and its modern utility are arguable. But the approach our
court has taken can only create uncertainty. As the matter now stands,
each new case must be a gamble until the Supreme Court has spoken
on it. Clarification of the law will come only when the court formally
abrogates Foakes v. Beer, and so ceases to examine each case individually in terms of the "fairness" of permitting further recovery
by the debtor.
ARTHUR S. QUIGLEY.

EDITORIAL NOTATION:

The conclusion expressed above should not be read as advocating
the complete abrogation of Foakes v. Beer in this state. The complaint against the court is rather that the circumvention of the rule by
various legal rationales makes it presently very difficult for an attorney
to advise his client, since a different body of law is applicable to each
theory. If the court simply would state that it is deciding each case
on the basis of the bona fides of the transaction, the state of the law
would be clearer. Furthermore, this notation suggests that such an
approach would be better than either a strict adherence to or a complete abrogation of the doctrine, although admitting that certainty
might not be as closely approached.
The primary justification for Foakes v. Beer is that it prevents
unscrupulous debtors from tendering a lesser sum than the amount
due and threatening the creditor with litigation if he wants the entire
debt. Yet we know that debtors unable to pay the full obligation and
creditors desirous of quick cash may often reach a fair compromise.
Courts following Foakes v. Beer penalize the bona fide debtor to deter
the "blackmailer". Courts abrogating the rule throw the gates open
to over-reaching.
An "equitable" approach is always subject to the criticism of uncertainty even though it is more satisfactory than the use of fictions.
Would not a middle ground, patterned after Section 90 of the RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACTS, looking at the individual case and yet based upon

enough legal principle to have an element of certainty, be more satisfactory than either following or ignoring the doctrine? Certainly it
would be an improvement over the present approach of the court.
The rule of Foakes v. Beer should be applied unless a promise not to
sue for the balance can be fairly found, followed by justifiable reliance of the debtor to his detriment. Three legal elements are involved. (1) If the parties are dealing fairly with one another, the
acceptance in "full payment" clearly implies a promise not to sue.
(2) With a rule that recognizes integrity, the debtor's reliance on that
promise cannot be said to be unjustified because of his knowledge
of the law of Foakes v. Beer. His knowledge is now that of the qualified rule submitted. (3) Finally, a true change of position (detrimental reliance) can be found simply from the payment by a man
financially embarrassed, from the continuation of an employment contract, or possibly from subsequent business conduct based upon the
assumption that the debt has been discharged. Under such an approach, Foakes v. Beer looms before the chiseler, yet does not harshly
surprise the naive.
RommT A. PURDUE.

